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LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN POST-ETHNIC CONFLICT SOCIETIES: CASES OF ZIMBABWE AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

This paper shows how the processes of trust-building and power-sharing are evolving in the cases of Zimbabwe and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the conflict. The paper's focus lies on lack of trust between different ethnic groups in the post-war period in terms of building political institutions and common political identity. Zimbabwe ethnic tensions originating from the Gukurahundi (1983-1987) between the Shona and the Ndebele people spilt over to the post-ethnic conflict society. Despite having the peace agreement known as the Unity Accord of 1987 to reduce tension in Zimbabwe, power-sharing remains the most untapped area for discussion. Similarly, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and the ethnic distribution of power given by the Dayton Peace Agreement are still one of the most significant elements of uncertainty and insecurity with dysfunctional ethnically based power-sharing as a result. With this review paper, we tend to answer several questions: What is the primary source of distrust and insecurity in post-conflict societies in Zimbabwe and Bosnia concerning the origins of those issues? What are the efforts of state institutions to promote unity and peace, and how do these peace accords affect institution-building processes?

Keywords: peace agreement; Zimbabwe; Bosnia and Herzegovina; ethnic conflict; social cohesion; power-sharing

1. INTRODUCTION

This research unravels how a lack of trust between ethnic groups can impact political development in post-ethnic conflict societies. A review of cases of Zimbabwe and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the contemporary era reveals that ethnic conflicts have direct implications on institution building in post-ethnic conflict societies. In the context of Zimbabwe, we will talk about The Gukurahundi (1982-1987) and complex political discussion in Zimbabwe's political history, while in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will talk about the result of ethnically based peace Agreement and lack of social and political consensus in rebuilding the political society. Both these cases under investigation experienced crimes of ethnic cleansing because of ethnic division followed by Peace Agreements to resolve conflict. Despite the Unity Accord (which ended the Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe) and the Dayton Peace Agreement (which ended the war in Bosnia), these societies face problematic power-sharing and ethnic division. Hence, this paper sought to compare and analyze the origins of ethnic issues and how they reflect on power-sharing and institutional framework.

THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE

2.1. Historical Background

Zimbabwe gained its independence on the 18th of April in 1980 from the colonial rulership of Ian Smith and the British government. The colonization of Zimbabwe by the White settler minority saw both the Shona-Ndebele clans rising against colonial rule (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Both ethnic groups fought for the independence of the country. Despite that, social transformations emerged after the country's independence in 1980 when power issues emerged between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by former Zimbabwe President Robert Gabriel Mugabe (a Shona) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo (a Ndebele). Despite the citizens having high hopes for peace and independence, the spirit of violence manifested just after the independence named 1982 Gukurahundi. Murambadoro (2015) argues that pre-colonial violence provides the basis for the Gukurahundi and all associated electoral violence in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) states that the complexities between the two ethnicities are often rooted in political power issues, which date back to the 1982 Gukurahundi.

2.2. The Gukurahundi and its Aftermath

According to Eppel (2008), Gukurahundi refers to the first rains that come before spring, and in this case, Gukurahundi sought to oppress the rebels as threats to power. The Gukurahundi genocide witnessed the 5th Brigade Army trained by North Korea under sanctioned by the then Zimbabwe President Mugabe to the massacre of people in the Midlands and, to a large extent, Matabeleland region to dismantle the ZAPU which stood as a potential threat to political power to ZANU-PF (Murambadoro 2015; Eppel 2008). The Gukurahundi has devastated Zimbabwe's political landscape (Ngwenya and Harris 2015). Muchemwa (2016) terms the period 1982-1987 as the most disastrous period between the Shona and the Ndebele people, from which more than 20,000 people died. This caused the loss of family members, friends and relatives, a case which haunts the survivors. The Gukurahundi endorsed an inner-state disease regarding ethnic trust issues.

In the aftermath of the Gukurahundi came the establishment of the 1987 Unity Accord. The violence of Gukurahundi ended with the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord between the two major political parties (ZAPU and ZANU), forming the joint ZANU-Patriotic Front (PF) as a unity peace agreement. Ray and Walsh (2024) state that despite the ZANU and ZAPU joining together and forming ZANU PF, the political tensions due to the 5th Brigade Army, which violently attacked the Ndebele people, still manifest in contemporary politics. The primary issue was that the Government did not discuss the historical incidents and instead, the issue was kept silent (Muchemwa 2016). Indeed, the Unity Accord spoke of reconciliation between ZANU and ZAPU without providing ethnic superiority or minority, instead silencing ethnic grievances from the Gukurahundi. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) states that the Ndebele people continue to have a feeling of marginalisation. In this case, issues concerning compensation or acceptance of the Gukurahundi were not brought forward.

However, this did not silence the voices of the victims, which now reflect a major weakness in the country's gospel of peace and unity. Maphosa (2011) states that the complexity of the issue is that the Ndebele blame the Shona people for exceeding power hunger, while the Shona blame the Ndebele for failing to adapt to the social environment. However, Tshuma and Ndlovu (2022) state that the Gukurahundi was not intended to massacre the Ndebele people but to develop a one-party state. The intricate often revolves around the idea that accepting the fault will result in even worse negative consequences. However, maintaining the status quo prevents compromises and underestimating political tension between the ethnic groups involved.

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This dilemma becomes even more pronounced when considering that after more than forty years, there are uncertainty and trust issues in post-colonial Zimbabwe. To reinforce this, Eppel (2004) states that Gukurahundi violence was not openly discussed at national and international levels for more than a decade after it happened.

2.3. Current ethnic tensions

Zimbabwe is a country located in Southern Africa with a population of 15 178 957 (National Statistics Agency ZIMSTAT 2022). The statistics show that 99.6% of Zimbabwe's population is African. However, the census did not provide ethnic statistics. Instead, Caucasians comprised 0.16% of the population, while mixed race and other races accounted for 0.2%. In addition, the statistics indicated that Shona is the most spoken language amongst the sixteen official languages (Chewa, Chibarwe, English, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda and Xhosa) which are provided in Section 6 of Zimbabwe 2013 Constitution. 80.9% of the Zimbabwe population said they spoke Shona in their early childhood. On the other hand, 11.5% of the population indicated that they talk the Ndebele language (ZIMSTAT 2022).

According to Moyo and Mathe's (2014) research findings, most of the Ndebele people can speak Shona, but it seems that most of the Shona people do not want to learn the Isi Ndebele language. In addition, Dube (2014) states that the Shona language has been forced to be taught to non-Shona-speaking students in the education sector. This can be tagged as contributing to most Shona speakers in the country. Nevertheless, the historical relationship between these two major ethnic groups (Shona and Ndebele) remains controversial (Moyo and Mathe 2014). In addition, Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007) argue that ethnic polarisation in Zimbabwe argues the Gukurahundi War of 1982-1986 contributed to the ethnic polarisation challenges nation-building. Using evidence from qualitative secondary sources, the study sought to analyse the sources of distrust and insecurities in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the study provides the efforts of State institutions to promote unity and peace. The study used relevant literature on Gukurahundi and ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe. In his study, Musanga (2024) argues that ethnic tensions in Zimbabwe still cover Zimbabwe. Hence, this study sought to contribute to the debate and discussions on post-ethnic conflict societies.

2.4. Institutional Efforts for Unity and Peace

Despite the Unity Accord yearly celebrated on the 22nd of December since 1987, there are suspicions and allegations of a lack of trust between the two ethnic societies. Mashingaidze (2005) states that the Unity Accord sought to resemble unity and peace, especially between the Ndebele and Shona people. The provisions of the Unity Accord aimed for peace and unity, and ZANU and ZAPU became one united political party. The Unity Accord sought to promote unity and peace in Zimbabwe. There have been grievances about compensation from the families of the victims. The research findings indicate the complexities of compensation and forgiveness for the perpetrators of Gukurahundi. Hence, there is limited trust in social structures as victims of Gukurahundi continuously seek justice for their actions. The primary intention of the Unity Accord was to promote peace and unity; however, the socio-political structures did not embrace true unity and trust in togetherness. Reim (2023) acknowledges the Unity Accord; however, it presents that transnational justice of the actions was not considered.

In addition, glimmers of hope prevailed as the Zimbabwe government attempted to bring the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) in 2009, which was then replaced by the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) (Murambadoro, Wielenga 2015). On the other hand, Vambe (2012) states that youths in Zimbabwe expect the Government to address the issue surrounding the massacre during the Gukurahundi era. On another note, as a way of promoting the healing of the wounds of Gukurahundi, Moyo-Nyoni (2022) states that storytelling has the potential to heal and encourage peacebuilding between ethnic groups. Family members pass on stories to the coming generation of their trauma of the Gukurahundi. The violent incidents continue to instil fear, insecurities and uncertainties in some of the victims (Murambadoro 2015; Ndakaripa 2014). Mashingaidze (2005) argues that the Gukurahundi still haunts the victims despite the major political parties announcing peace. Many memories should be revisited and spoken out. Information is, therefore, inherently passed on to families. Nevertheless, narrative storytelling can contribute to building trust in communities and can also instil misunderstandings (Williams et al. 2003). Indeed, the major drawback is the acceptance of the perpetrators, which can compromise trust. However, Ndakaripa (2014) states that narrative storytelling details past events and predicts future relations between ethnic groups. The bitterness of the victims of the Gukurahundi has been passed on through narrative storytelling of the events of the Fifth Brigade.

THE CASE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

3.1. Bosnia's road to independence – historical background

The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee[1] which in The Opinion no. 3 stated how Yugoslavia is in a process of dissolution started long and violent period of independence struggles (Pellet 1992). Following the steps of Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina also decided to finalise separation from Yugoslavia, finding its legitimation in the state referendum held on the 29th of February and 1st of March 1992 (Ibrahimagić 2005). The need for referendum was expressed in 4th Opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, which stated that expression of the peoples' will, about the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina being constituted as a sovereign and independent state, cannot be considered entirely founded without the referendum (Trnka 2000). In this sense, for Bosnia-Herzegovina to achieve international recognition, a referendum for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held under the control of international observers who later confirmed that it was conducted according to all international democratic standards (Kurtćehajić 2017). The legitimacy of the referendum's results has been the subject of debate and point of disagreement between domestic political elites in terms of whether it represented the will of all ethnic structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina or not. The successful referendum fulfilled the necessary condition for international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hoare 2007). Accordingly, the European Community and its member states recognised the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state within its existing borders on April 6th, 1992, and the USA recognised it on April 7th, a day after (Carmichael 2015). The Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadžić, today a Hague inductee, did not want to agree with solution that a former republic with some extent of Serbs population would not be within the same state and set out

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1   The Arbitration Commission within the framework of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, better known as the Badinter Commission, was an arbitration commission established by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) on August 27, 1991, whose task was to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis by resolving disputed legal issues in the former Yugoslavia. Robert Badinter was appointed president of a five-member commission made up of presidents of constitutional courts from EEC member states. According to the opinion of the commission, in the conclusion adopted on November 29, 1991, the SFRY disintegrated, and the borders between the former federal units were taken as the state borders of the newly created countries, which cannot be changed by force. This decision provided a legal basis for the recognition of the independence of the republics of the former SFRY, and based on it, on January 15, 1992, the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) recognized the state independence of Croatia and Slovenia within the existing borders.

to implement their will, which they expressed in an illegally held plebiscite, to live in a joint Yugoslav state that includes Serbia, Montenegro, and the autonomous Serbian region of Kninska Krajina, and the areas of Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem, which they could not achieve in any other way than by force of arms, defying the entire international community (Donia 2016; Zagorac 2008; Kurtćehajić 2017). This was the immediate cause of three and a half – years long aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, which emphasized that Serbs need and have the right to live in one state, encouraging and animating for this idea the Bosnian Serbs who accepted the leadership of Karadžić, which led to the greatest genocide and war crimes in Europe after the Second World War (Primarily of the Bosniak Muslim population, but also Croatian and Serbian population). The war ended with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its eleven annexes being initiated in Dayton on November 21st and signed in Paris on December 14th, 1995, which established peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kunrath 2010). Annex 4 out of eleven provides constitutional solutions for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which cemented ethnic divisions within both social and institutional structures that, to this date, remain unreformed, creating an unstable socio-political environment.

3.2. Major origins of ethnic tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The decades-long dysfunctional political environment in B&H between different ethnic groups and constituent peoples arose over the referendum and is influenced by numerous political and historical factors. In this paper, we targeted those we see as crucial in maintaining the Bosnian society unsafe from violence even three decades after the armed conflict. The first factor we are addressing is the social composition of the Bosnian population in terms of ethnicity and religion. According to the 1991 population census, Muslims (since the 1993 Assembly and according to the 1995 Constitution, the term is Bosniaks) comprised 43,38% of the population, Serbs comprised 31,18% and Croats 17,36% (Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991). As we can see, there wasn't a titular nation consisting of the majority of the population. It is one of the reasons why three ethnic groups in Bosnia envisioned different paths. Bosniaks saw Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, and Serbs saw Bosnia-Herzegovina as a part of a new Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro. At the same time, Croats wanted division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and annexing the territory with a Croat majority into Croatia (Ibrahimagić 2008). Different

perspectives of the Bosnian future remain on the ground floor for fear of new violence until this day.

Both Serb and Croat political elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasize the fact that they do not see Bosnia-Herzegovina as their nut state but Serbia and Croatia. Division of power, according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, made the Bosnia-Herzegovina dysfunctional aspiring democracy with constant threat of possible new conflict on the basis of illegal secession or reformation of entities. This leads us to the following factor, which is historically based on the aspirations of Serbia and Croatia to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina. The division is based on ethnicity and religion, meaning where Croats are majority to belong to Croatia and where Serbs are the majority to belong to Serbia both treating Muslims (Bosniaks) as if they do not live in B&H at all. Historically, the two most significant attempts to divide Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia were Cvetković-Maček Agreement from 1939 and the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement from 1991 (Pejanović 2010). In the agreement between Tuđman and Milošević in Karađorđevo in March 1991, the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discussed in principle; where Serbs are in the majority belongs to Serbia, where Croats are the majority belongs to Croatia, and for Muslims it is planned to leave a "small Muslim state in the middle" (Lucić 2005). The book *Transcripts on the Partition of Bosnia* (Lucić 2005) contains the complete texts of thirty-six transcripts of conversations between F. Tuđman and his partners that took place between 1991 and 1999. The first transcripts from 1991 and the first half of 1992 talk about the reasons and intentions to realize the borders of "Greater Croatia" (Lucić 2005: 71). The agreement in Karađorđevo has its roots in the Cvetković-Maček Agreement of August 26th, 1939. That agreement was between Dragiša Cvetković, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and Vladko Maček, President of the Croatian Peasant Party, and it envisaged the division of Bosnia between the Serbian and Croatian spheres of interest. Bosniaks were treated as if they didn't live in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all. Although the Muslims had their representatives in the parliament, led by JMO headed by Mehmed Spaho, Croatia got a ban on that agreement to the detriment of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

All these differences and different aspirations for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina culminated in the war of aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Agreement, even though it closed armed conflict, was cemented with Annex 4, the Constitution, this ethnic division of the political system making it unsafe for violence in future. Primarily regarding the internal structure, it defines that Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with

Bosniak and Croat majority) and the Republic of Srpska (with Serbs majority) (Annex 4 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina Article 1 Paragraph 3). The decision-making process on all levels of state and entity governments is such that it needs majority support from all three ethnic groups (constituent peoples), and each one of the constituent people can block or veto decision-making processes if they do not see it fit for their ethnic interests. This decision-making model is creating a dysfunctional democracy, as we already said. But in the light of this paper, we want to outline in the end that it once more cemented different perspectives on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina making it unsafe in the eyes of ordinary people. The destabilising narrative coming from the entity of the Republic of Srpska and its leader, Milorad Dodik, constantly announcing secession of the Entity of the Republic of Srpska, is creating an unpopular political and security climate and undermines the perspective of Euro-Atlantic integrations.

3.3. Dayton Peace Agreement as a contributor to constant insecurities

Analysing primary sources including Anex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement (The Constitution), The Constitution of Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina and The Constitution of Republic of Srpska comparing them to the former Constitution of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we identified key issues in terms of ethnically based power-sharing in Bosnian political institutions. Firstly, the procedure of adopting the Constitution as a part of the Peace Agreement is known as a pioneer example of such practice. This means that the national Parliament, enrolled on adopting changes to the Constitution, was not involved in the process, but the Constitution was drafted by international community itself. These circumstances spawned serious questions regarding the legitimacy of the Document. In the first place, The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed by Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while latter was not internationally recognized under that name (Kurtćehajić 2024). This means that, against international law, one of the active participants and signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement was an unrecognised state. Secondly, Anex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement and other Annexes were signed by parties including entity of Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina and entity Republic of Srpska, all while subject of international law are exclusively sovereign states and not entities. This makes the legality of the Dayton Peace Agreement and Anex 4 debatable. In the interview with prof. dr. Omer Ibrahimagić, expert on constitutional law and political system, former president of Constitutional Court of Federation

Bosnia-Herzegovina and former judge of the Constitutional court of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, we discussed legality and legitimacy of Dayton Accords. Describing the tone of negotiations, he said:

> "A lot of solutions in the Dayton were the result of high political pressure imposed by the mediators of the peace negotiations. We know that according to Vienna Convention any international agreement made under duress may be subject to annulment. Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina never adopted the Anex 4 as a constitution nor we have official translation to Bosnian language. The only official version of the Constitution is one in English published by the UN. One version unofficially translated to local languages and published by the OHR is not legitimate. This all leads to manipulation in terms of interpretation itself" (Ibrahimagić 2024).

Additionally, besides these formal deficiencies, there are many construction errors and contradictions directly influencing ethnic divisions. The problem is in the name of the entity Republic of Srpska, which got a name after only one people, Serbs, while all three people are constituent or equal in all territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Article I.1 Anex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement). This name is discriminatory in that it does not include or mention Croats, Bosniaks and Other all named in the Constitution of Bosnia and entities (See: Preamble of Anex 4 Dayton Peace Agreement).

Lastly, the most important contradiction within the Anex 4 is the serious violation of human rights and basic freedoms. In Article II.1 and Article II.2. of the Anex 4 it is stated that European convention for protection of human rights and basic freedoms and its Protocols have supremacy over domestic law and will be directly applicable in B&H. At the same time, ethnically based power-sharing and decision-making in national institutions deeply violate those human rights. This is confirmed by European Court of Human Rights judgments in a group of *Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina*. One of the priorities for membership in the European Union, which Bosnia-Herzegovina must resolve and harmonise with EU legislation, is precisely the implementation of judgments to correct these structural errors. In May 2019, the European Commission adopted an Opinion (Avis) on Bosnia-Herzegovina's application for membership in the EU, which, among other things, stated that B&H still does not sufficiently meet the criteria related to the stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities, set by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 (Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for membership of the European Union – Council conclusions, December 10, 2019, Brussels). The first such judgment was in 2009 when

the decision was made in the case *Sejdić and Finci v. B&H*, in which it was clearly stated that the Constitution is discriminatory because it does not allow someone from a minority to run for the position of a member of the Presidency or a delegate in the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly. Dervo Sjedić, on behalf of the Roma community, and Jakob Finci, president of the Jewish community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, filed an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights warning of these discriminatory provisions. In the past fifteen years, numerous debates, round tables and gatherings of international, governmental and non-governmental organisations have been organised. The topic was implementing that ruling, which should change the Constitution and, consequently, the Election Law, but this has not yet happened. Rather, it started a domino effect of similar serious rulings. Other rulings include following examples of ethnic discrimination: In July 2014, the European Court of Human Rights issued a verdict in the case *Zornić v. B&H* due to Ms. Zornić's inability to participate in the elections for the House of Peoples and the Presidency as a candidate, because she does not declare herself to be a member of one of the three named constituent peoples. Furthermore, in 2016, the Court of Human Rights decided in the *Pilav v. B&H* case, that Ilijaz Pilav from Srebrenica, an entity Republic of Srpska, being unable to run in the elections for a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina because he is Bosniak living in entity of Republic of Srpska is against the law. The court concluded that Mr. Pilav, who declared himself a member of one of the three equal or constituent peoples, had the constitutional right to participate in the elections for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the Constitution and the Election Law say that three members of Presidency (one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb) are selected such that Croat and Bosniak members can only be elected from the constituency of entity Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast, the Serbs member's constituency is an entity of the Republic of Srpska. He would have to leave his home and move to the entity Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to realise his rights. Similarly, in December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights issued a verdict in the case *Pudarić v. B&H*, in which it found that B&H discriminated against Svetozar Pudarić in connection with the right to run for membership of the Presidency from among the Serbian people in the territory of the Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina. Svetozar Pudarić ran in the general elections in 2018 as a member of the Presidency from among the Serbian people, but the Central Election Commission of Bosnia rejected his candidacy, because as a Serb with a place of residence in the Federation of B&H, he cannot run for that position. The last judgment of this category was passed on August 29, 2023, in the case *Kovačević v. B&H*. In

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this application, the applicant Slaven Kovačević, who was born in Sarajevo, where he lives and works as a political adviser to a member of the Presidency, complained that he, as someone who has not declared that he belongs to a single-named nation, is not represented in the House of Peoples, because his positions are exclusively reserved for Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Also, this was the first time that a violation of the right to vote was detected, while previous complaints related to passive suffrage. That is why it is important to note that the application also referred to the claim of the applicant Kovačević that in the last elections for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, his choice was limited because he could only vote for a Bosniak or Croat member of the Presidency. He could not vote for the Serb member of the Presidency because only citizens from the Republic of Srpska entity have that option. This was the case due to the mixture of territorial and ethnic criteria, which have already been explained. The European Court of Human Rights emphasised in its judgment that "no one should be forced to vote only according to prescribed ethnic lines, regardless of their political point of view" and therefore considers that the applicant's right is violated. Therefore, in this case, the Court identified two forms of discrimination, namely discrimination related to the applicant's right to be represented in the House of Peoples and discrimination related to his active right to vote for a member of the Presidency.

4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

4.1. Similarities and Differences

The analysis presented that the socio-political history in Zimbabwe as well as in B&H contributed to the conflicts in respective cases of study and the present-day ethnic tensions. The Shona-speaking people and the Ndebele people are the major ethnic groups, with the Shona being the majority (ZIMSTAT 2022). A closer analysis reveals that in terms of Zimbabwe, the tension was more rooted in Mugabe's desire for power. Furthermore, Ndlovu (2023) states that power contestations have been reflected in Zimbabwe politics between ZANU and ZAPU. The Five Brigade strengthened Mugabe's desire for power. The divergent view reflects that in terms of B&H was based on divergent political views of ethnic groups Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.

In terms of religion, a comparison between Zimbabwe and B&H. In the case of Zimbabwe, the church or religion is trying to bring the gospel of forgiveness to the historical tensions and events of Gukurahundi. Chitando et al. (2021), recognize the very slow progress of the church's efforts to promote peace through openness and

apologies. The study presented that ethnic tensions were more pronounced on religion as a contributing factor to the conflict as the Bosniaks (Muslims) were treated as foreigners in the B&H.

The study presented that despite the Dayton Peace Agreement bringing peace to the armed conflict, another door of tension was opened due to Annex 4 providing B&H as two entities as this was previously discussed. Furthermore, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed by B&H, Croatia and Yugoslavia contrast to the Zimbabwe situation, the Unity Peace Accord joined the two political parties ZAPU and ZANU forming ZANU PF. Despite having the Gukurahundi and state-led peace and unity efforts to promote unity in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has been subjected to trust issues and reconciliation issues which Tshuma's (2018) study argues identifies the problem rooted in the Government's unwillingness to embrace the truth of the historical past events. A similar issue in this case reflects the ethnical power sharing in political conduct in Zimbabwe as well as in Zimbabwe and Bosnian political institutions.

SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

5.1. Theoretical findings

The findings presented that the aftermath of the Gukurahundi brought trust issues in the socio-political society in Zimbabwe. Ndakaripa (2014) states that the suspicions of the Ndebele people joining ZAPU and the Shona people joining ZANU PF contributed to the divisions and violence between the two groups. In this case, Ndebele people are more guarded about the demands for compensation for the survivors and the victims' families (Ndlovu 2023; Ugochukwu 2023). The complexity is also that ZANU PF sought to dismiss and silence the rise of human rights organisations. However, the international community responded passively to the Gukurahundi (Alexander 2021; Cameron 2018). Unlike in Zimbabwe, in B&H there is constant political instability while ethnicity is used as a power-sharing tool for maintaining status quo. Currently, B&H remains unsafe from violence while in the same time being internally divided with completely new internal structure.

According to Reim (2023), the effects of Gukurahundi still manifest in contemporary politics. The author indicates that during the 2010s Gukurahundi activism was rekindled by the Mthwakazi Republic Party claiming the redress of the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. It is vital to mention that the socio-economic and political structures of Zimbabwe are very complex. Ethnic relations are also rooted in differ-

ences in socio-economic levels of development. In this case, Murambadoro (2015) states that it remains difficult to have true peace and reconciliation unless the history of the Gukurahundi is visited. There is not equal development effort in country regions; for instance, Nkayi District in Matabeleland province is less and poorly developed (Gova and Ndlovu 2013). The relationship between the Shona and the Ndebele people remains complicated and yet one of the principles of the State motto is Unity, Peace, Development followed by freedom and work. The disparity and weaknesses in unity are reflected in emerging political parties in Matabeleland regions and Midlands, such as the Mthwakazi Liberation Front (Muchemwa 2016). Alexander (2021) states that Mthwakazi activists are angry and devastated over the Gukurahundi. The research findings showed that a lack of trust cultivates a challenging political environment. In this case, the democratic state is weakened by a lack of trust in society. There is tension and struggle for political power between ZANU-PF and Ndebele speakers that must be addressed for an expected nation-building.

In the same vein, less attention has been paid to the acute issue of low political participation and its role in compromising peace, unity and trust in socio-political structures. Developing a politically stable environment in a post-ethnic conflict society is difficult. The distinction in political participation marks Zimbabwe's political system as ethnopolitical. Before the Zimbabwe 2023 elections, Harris (2022) provides low voter statistics in Bulawayo regions having 270 914 registered voters out of 5 804 975 voters as per Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) statistics. On the other hand, Tshuma (2021) stated that political parties blame ZEC, which is accused of aligning with the ruling party ZANU-PF for the low voter turnout in Matabeleland regions arguing that there is poor conduct of voter education and voter registration processes. The premise holds that the Gukurahundi reflected an interpretation of the differences between the Shona and the Ndebele in political participation.

5.2. Implications for Policy and Practice

The 1987 Unity Accord stands as the foundation for the promotion of peace and unity in Zimbabwe. At the time of writing, the President of Zimbabwe, Emerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa launched the Gukurahundi Community Outreach Programme in the Matabeleland region which he terms a transformative odyssey towards nation-building and sustainable development (Government of Zimbabwe 2024). President Mnangagwa further expressed that healing from the wounds of Gukurahundi through storytelling promotes a desired environment towards Zimbabwe Vision 2030 for eco-

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nomic transformation. Unlike Zimbabwe, the results of war in B&H in terms of ethnical division were used as a basis for peace negotiations, thus creating a completely nonfunctional society and unstable political climate. Nation-building or state-building processes are replaced by the party politics of building ethnically divided entities and cantons using lower levels of government as tools for blocking higher levels of government. At the same time, leading political elites in B&H are having completely different visions of its future.

6. CONCLUSION

The study provided an analysis of post-ethnic societies with reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Zimbabwe as case studies towards understanding trust issues between ethnic groups. Despite the Unity Accord in Zimbabwe and the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia, ethnic tensions have remained in both cases. A closer analysis of the cases reveals that in case of Zimbabwe the ethnic was rooted in political power between the Shona and Ndebele people and in Bosnia-Herzegovina the problem was more pronounced on ethnicity (religion and language). The study concludes that there are uncertainties and insecurities in political conduct and power sharing.

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NEDOSTATAK POVERENJA IZMEĐU ETNIČKIH GRUPA U POSKONFLIKTNIM DRUŠTVIMA: SLUČAJEVI ZIMBABVEA I BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

Sažetak:

Ovaj rad daje prikaz procesa izgradnje povjerenja između različitih etničkih grupa u slučajevima rata u Zimbabveu i rata u Bosni i Hercegovini sa fokusom na nedostatak povjerenja između različitih etničkih grupa u poslijeratnom periodu u smislu izgradnje političkih institucija, podjele moći i zajedničkog političkog identiteta. Etničke tenzije u Zimbabveu koje potiču od krvavog sukoba između naroda Šona i Ndebele prelile su se i na društvo nakon etničkog sukoba. Uprkos tome što postoji mirovni sporazum poznat kao Sporazum o jedinstvu iz 1987. za smanjenje napetosti u Zimbabveu, raspodjela moći nakon sukoba ostaje dominanto područje neslaganja. Slično tome, rat u Bosni i Hercegovini kao posljedica raspada Jugoslavije u godinama 1992-1995. i etnička raspodjela moći koja je uspostavljena Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom i dalje su jedan od najvećih elemenata neizvjesnosti i nesigurnosti. Ovim preglednim radom težimo da odgovorimo na nekoliko pitanja: šta je glavni izvor nepovjerenja i nesigurnosti u društvima u Zimbabveu i Bosni i Hercegovini, kakvi su korijeni tih problema te koliko su mirovni sporazumi kojim su se okončali sukobi doprinijeli stvaranju stabilnih političkih institucija?

Ključne riječi: mirovni sporazum; Zimbabve; Bosna i Hercegovina; etnički sukob; socijalna kohezija; raspodjela moći

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